The 2025 landscape for top shipping operators is defined by a sharp divergence in alliance strategies, a widening gap in capacity expansion appetites, and distinct exposures to geopolitical trade barriers.
Alliance Strategies: Isolation vs. New Cooperations
The most structural difference in 2025 is the disintegration of the traditional 2M and THE Alliance structures, leading to three distinct strategic approaches:
- The “Stand-Alone” Giant (MSC): Mediterranean Shipping Co. (MSC) has adopted a strategy of total independence. Following the end of its partnership with Maersk, MSC is “going alone” to maintain full control over its destiny, prioritizing speed, agility, and independent decision-making. To support this, MSC has aggressively expanded its network, managing a stand-alone global network that operates outside of any alliance.
- The “Reliability-Focused” Partners (Gemini Cooperation): Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd have formed the “Gemini Cooperation” (effective February 2025), which diverges from the sheer scale of MSC by prioritizing schedule reliability and network efficiency. This strategy utilizes a “hub-and-spoke” model, which may require different vessel deployment patterns, such as larger vessels on feeder services, to achieve high on-time reliability and lower inventory costs for clients.
- The “Stable” and “Regrouped” Alliances: The Ocean Alliance (CMA CGM, COSCO, Evergreen, and OOCL) remains the only major alliance operating unchanged, offering stability amidst the market churn. Meanwhile, ONE, HMM, and Yang Ming have regrouped into the “Premier Alliance” to maintain competitive coverage.
Capacity Aggression vs. Restraint
There is a significant disparity in fleet growth strategies, with some carriers pursuing massive expansion while others exercise restraint to focus on profitability or logistics integration.
MSC is in a league of its own regarding pure capacity. By December 2025, MSC’s active capacity is projected to reach approximately 7.1 million TEU, a massive lead over second-place Maersk at 4.6 million TEU. Furthermore, MSC’s orderbook alone (approx. 2.1 million TEU) is larger than the entire active fleets of major carriers like ONE or Evergreen.
A major shift is occurring for the runner-up spot. While Maersk currently holds the #2 rank in active ships, CMA CGM is aggressively challenging this position. CMA CGM has a massive orderbook of roughly 1.9 million TEU (compared to Maersk’s ~0.8 million TEU). When combined with their active fleet, CMA CGM’s total pipeline capacity (approx. 6.0 million TEU) significantly outstrips Maersk’s total pipeline (approx. 5.4 million TEU), signaling CMA CGM’s intent to dominate through asset expansion while Maersk pivots toward logistics and cost discipline.
HMM has entered the “One-Million-TEU Club,” doubling its fleet in five years through a state-supported expansion program. Distinct from other operators, HMM’s strategy is tightly linked to supporting the South Korean shipbuilding industry, with its entire newbuilding program constructed domestically.
Observations
The industry is collectively shifting toward larger vessels to lower unit costs, but the implementation varies. For the first time, ULCS vessels (above 15,000 TEU) have overtaken the 5,100–10,000 TEU segment in market share.
The drive for scale is evident in the order books. For example, Evergreen’s orderbook represents nearly 44% of its existing fleet size (0.85M TEU order vs. 1.94M TEU existing), indicating a rapid modernization and upsizing strategy. In contrast, operators like COSCO and Yang Ming have more conservative order-to-fleet ratios.
Fleet Composition and Geopolitical Exposure
Operators face differing levels of exposure to new United States trade policies, specifically potential port fees targeting Chinese-built vessels. This has forced distinct fleet management strategies.
Exposure Levels
COSCO and CMA CGM appear to be more exposed to potential U.S. fees on Chinese-built ships compared to their rivals. In contrast, MSC and Maersk have fleets that are less reliant on Chinese-built tonnage, positioning them better to mitigate these specific costs.
Redeployment Strategy
To adapt, carriers with high exposure are expected to reorganize their networks, moving Chinese-built vessels away from U.S.-bound trade lanes and redeploying them to other regions. This necessitates a flexible fleet strategy where operators must juggle asset nationality alongside pure capacity requirements.
Also, overall, comparing the weekly trading capacities between December 2024 and December 2025, the Trans-Atlantic and Feast–Europe weekly capacities increased, while the Trans-Pacific capacity saw a reduction.
You can view the 2025 shipping landscape like a redeveloping city transit system. MSC is building its own private super-highway system, adding lanes and buying buses (ships) faster than anyone else to run everywhere alone. Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd are building a synchronized “metro” system (Gemini), where they don’t promise to go everywhere, but they promise the trains will run strictly on time using a precise central hub. Meanwhile, CMA CGM is quietly buying enough new rolling stock to potentially overtake the metro system in size, betting that having the most seats available will win the day.
Shipping companies, powered by strategic leadership, transform global trade. Behind the scenes, these teams are evolving rapidly, and success is defined by those who excel at change management and operationalize strategies and large-scale transformations. Alcott Global works with supply chain organizations to place leaders who can make that happen.
Sources:
- Top 100, Alphaliner
- Top 10 Shipping Lines December 2024 – Riding the Waves of Volatility, Alcott Global
- 2025 Review of maritime transport, United Nations
- Key Container Shipping Data Trends: October 2025, AXS Marine
